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William Penn, William Petty, 
and Surveying 
THE IRISH CONNECTION 
Marcus Gallo 
During the seventeenth century, English imperialists embraced the technology 
of geometric surveying that intellectuals had begun to popularize during the six­
teenth century. This new style of surveying, with its emphasis on quantitative 
measurement, differed from medieval surveys that focused on enumerating ten­
ants' traditional rights and assessing land with qualitative descriptions. While 
geometric surveys could help lords modernize their estate management, over­
seas conquests provided the fullest demonstration of how surveyors could 
empower both private speculators and the state. As the land market developed 
throughout the spreading English empire, surveyors embraced a new mathemat­
ical and geographical literacy. 1 
Although he was only a child during the conquest of Ireland, William Penn 
numbered among the prominent men whose Irish experience convinced him of 
the usefulness of geometric surveys. During the 1650s, technocratic surveying 
experienced a turning point with the Down Survey in Ireland, which measured 
Irish lands and apportioned them into English hands. Successful surveying on 
that island convinced English elites to export surveying to North America, along 
with the conceptions of private property that surveying enabled. Penn's famil­
iarity with the effects of surveying on his family's estates deeply influenced his 
plans for the settlement of Pennsylvania.2 
English and Irish history had intertwined for centuries prior to Cromwell's 
decisive colonization in the seventeenth century. Normans first invaded Ireland 
in 1169, and "Old English" Norman lords soon controlled the Pale around Dub ­
lin with virtual autonomy. The Old English mixed with Gaelic elites and formed 
a hybrid society that became almost totally isolated from England. In the early 
sixteenth century, the English returned to conquer Ireland once again. Faced 
with staunch resistance, English elites established lordship over Irish subjects 
through military campaigns and institutionalized terror, such as the atrocities 
in Munster in 1569, when Sir Humphrey Gilbert decapitated each day's Irish 
casualties and decorated his camp with the heads. This reconquest took a century, 
culminating in 1659 with the Down Survey and the attendant redistribution of 
Irish lands among English landlords. English efforts took place on a huge scale, 
with large invasion forces followed by hundreds of thousands of immigrating 
settlers in the mid-seventeenth century.3 
The crown employed the lure of Irish lands to finance its military campaigns. 
Beginning in 1565, Elizabeth authorized entrepreneurial younger sons of the gen­
try to form joint-stock companies to pacify specific groups oflrish "rebels" and 
take their lands. Many of the English conquerors came from the West Country 
around Devon, and some, like Gilbert and Richard Grenville, later became influ­
ential in American colonization projects. In another example, Ralph Lane left 
Ireland after a short stint to oversee the colony at Roanoke in 1585 and 1586. After 
Roanoke failed, Lane returned to Ireland for more than a decade, overseeing 
combat forces and establishing a plantation. The earliest attempts at English col­
onization often ended in military disaster on both sides of the Atlantic, but this 
did not stop continued invasions, and Ireland became an early model for fran­
chising empire across the sea.4 
The English justified their invasions in two ways: by claiming ancient Norman 
titles to Irish lands and by asserting that the culturally inferior Irish needed 
English civilization. Norman titles provided a legal right, but the cultural argu­
ment satisfied those Englishmen more deeply troubled about the ethics of con­
quering the Irish. Although in theory the English had reigned over parts oflreland 
for four centuries, the "New" English had practically no contact with the Irish 
prior to their invasions. The foreignness of Gaelic Irish culture allayed English 
qualms. Had the Irish simply been Catholic, this alone might have justified would­
be cultural imperialists. Worse than encountering Catholics, the English discov­
ered a nation of ignorant priests and ruined churches, where unfamiliar pagan 
practices tinged Christian rites. English theorists like Sir John Davies claimed that 
the English would civilize Ireland, just as the Romans had civilized ancient Britain 
and the Spaniards had brought civilization to the Americas.5 
Among Irish incivilities, perhaps the most heinous was improper land use. 
While the invading English had begun enclosing their commons, many Irish 
clung to an antiquated form of pastoral agriculture, allowing their herds to 
meander between open meadows. This especially held true in the upland regions 
dominated by the Gaelic Irish, where a lack of arable land prevented intensive 
agriculture, and low population densities allowed high geographic mobility. 
Combined with the fact that families and clans, rather than individuals, held 
property, the Irish tended not to invest in improvements to their buildings and 
lands to the extent that the English did.6 
In the late sixteenth century, the English colonist Thomas Smith compared 
the Irish to roving herdsmen like Tartars or Arabs. Edmund Spenser felt that 
the nomadic Irish must have been the barbaric descendants of nomadic Scyth­
ians. As late as 1655, Richard Lawrence, an English planter living in Ireland, wrote 
that the Irish had created a "waste Wilderness" with their lands. During the 1590s 
another English philosopher of colonization, William Herbert, wrote that, "Col­
onies degenerate assuredly when the colonists imitate and embrace the habits, 
customs, and practices of the natives .... Once you have removed those things 
which can alienate hearts and minds, they will both become united, first in hab­
its, then in mind." Breaking Irish control over Ireland entailed breaking Irish 
culture, and that meant disrupting Irish land-use practices. Otherwise, in Herbert's 
view, the conquerors themselves would degenerate into barbarians, just as the 
Old English had assimilated into barbarous Irishness.7 
In 1641, a revolt in Ulster by Catholic landholders prompted the final mili­
tary stage of Ireland's conquest. Taken by surprise and horrified by the flight of 
several thousand Protestant settlers, the English hung suspected rebels without 
trials, specifically targeting women and other civilians. English ferocity cowed 
the initial rebellion but also caused many of the formerly placid Catholic inhab­
itants to join the revolt, including many of the Old English.8 
Although few Protestants died in the early days of the revolt, the death toll 
from the unrest eventually rose to ten thousand people, evenly split between both 
sides. Despite the relative bloodlessness of the initial uprising, the memory of 
Catholic Irish atrocities motivated English actions for the next decade. In 1650, 
Oliver Cromwell referred to the Irish actions in the "Massacre of 1641" as "unpro­
voked ... the most unheard of and most barbarous massacre (without respect 
of sex and age) that ever the sun beheld." Irish rejection of the obvious material 
benefits of English rule particularly galled Cromwell. He pointed out that the 
Irish rebelled even though, "through the example of English industry, through 
commerce and traffic, that which was in the natives' hands was better to them 
than if all Ireland had been in their possession, and not an Englishman in it."9 
Meanwhile, in 1642, tensions heightened between the Crown and Parliament, 
giving rise to the first English Civil War. In response to the ongoing troubles in 
Ireland, a distracted Parliament returned to earlier models of colonization by 
passing the Adventurer's Act, which would grant land to participating "adven­
turers" in return for their financial investment in the reconquest, at the rate of 
one shilling per acre. This amounted to a huge discount on Irish land, which typi­
cally sold for six to twelve times that amount. In 1643, adventurers could double 
the amount of land they received by giving an additional quarter of the money 
they had originally advanced. Nonetheless, by the end of the war, adventurers 
had only covered the costs of about a tenth of the subjugation effort.10
Following the Doubling Ordinance, the opposing forces conducted a truce. 
Charles I installed a royalist governor who transferred many of his soldiers from 
Ireland to England to fight the parliamentarian forces. Hostilities flared seriously 
in 1647, following the king's initial defeat. With Parliament now in control in 
Dublin, English commanders conducted pitiless attacks against the rebels, 
including the massacre of between three and five thousand fleeing soldiers and 
prisoners at Dungan's Hill in August 1647.11 
Due to the onset of the second English Civil War, parliamentary forces in Ire­
land became temporarily isolated, causing them to sue for a truce with the Irish 
in 1649. Despite the execution of the king in January 1649, the royalists remained 
well organized in Ireland, causing Oliver Cromwell to bring his twelve-thousand­
man New Model Army across the Irish Sea that August. Fearing that Irish Catholic 
soldiers could be used to advance the royalist cause, Cromwell struck quickly, 
massacring three thousand Irish soldiers and inhabitants at the Siege ofDrogheda 
in September 1649, and another two thousand at Wexford in October. 12 
The bloody displays at Drogheda and Wexford encouraged a variety of 
other Irish forces to surrender without a fight. By May 1650, when Cromwell left 
Ireland to turn his attention to Scotland, almost all the principal towns of Ulster, 
Leinster, and Munster lay in English hands. Over the next few years, fighting in 
Ireland entered a new phase as royalist and Irish armies lost control of their last 
urban strongholds. Ireland became the site of an extended counterinsurgency 
operation against guerrilla units led by Catholic aristocrats. The English divided 
the countryside into "protected" and "outlawed" zones: in outlawed regions, the 
army could kill people and cattle, destroy buildings, and set fire to crops without 
cause. 13 
Exacerbating an already dire situation, in 1649 Atlantic shipping brought the 
bubonic plague to Galway in the western, heavily Catholic region of Connacht. 
While English scorched-earth tactics helped produce famine, military move­
ments and forced migrations helped spread this devastating epidemic around 
the island. Taken as a whole, disease and starvation combined with military and 
civilian casualties to kill perhaps as much as 25 percent of Ireland's population 
of almost two million. By the 1650s, following massacres, reprisals, total war­
fare, and mass death, the English felt little empathy for their Irish subjects. To 
bring security and English civilization to the island and to pay for the subjuga­
tion effort, the conquerors now looked to engage in an unprecedented bureau­
cratic effort to redistribute Irish property to Protestants. In total, more than 
thirty thousand soldiers and 1 ,500 adventurers would gain access to approxi­
mately eleven million acres of land. 14 
The effort to survey Ireland began long before the 1641 rebellion. In 1537, Henry 
VIII asked for descriptive surveys of royal lands around Dublin, with an eye 
toward increasing rents. By the 1540s, English officials pressed for a variety of 
surveys and military maps. Edward VI installed Ireland's first surveyor general 
to oversee crown lands in 1548. Beginning in the 1560s, English cartographers 
leveraged increasingly accurate surveys to produce detailed maps of contested 
portions ofireland. Immediately before the rebellion, between 1633 and 1636, the 
English conducted the Strafford Survey in Connacht in anticipation of further 
colonization. This survey took the form of an index of place names and land­
owners, with descriptions of the soil, its inhabitants and buildings. At the time, 
Ireland had not been comprehensively surveyed, and the Strafford surveyors made 
no attempt to measure the land or assess the value of its acreage.15 
By the mid-165os, the English government had an annual deficit of £450,000 
due to its operations in Ireland. Because the English intended to pay their sol­
diers and adventurers with Irish land, delay in distributing those lands created 
additional debts. Facing these budgetary constraints, parliament passed an act 
to conduct a comprehensive survey of the island's forfeited lands in 1653. As a 
result, Ireland's surveyor general, Benjamin Worsley, began to conduct what 
became known as the Gross Survey. Prospective English landholders paid one 
pound for every five hundred acres of land to be measured and mapped. The 
Gross Surveyors conducted their work quickly, estimating lands rather than 
carefully measuring and evaluating them. Soldiers objected to this shoddy work, 
which halted in the fall ofi654. 16 
As a result, in 1654 civil administrators began to conduct the Civil Survey in 
counties that had not already been examined by the earlier Strafford Survey. In 
contrast to the Strafford Survey, the Civil Survey noted landowners along with 
their acreage, distinguishing between profitable and unprofitable acres. The Civil 
Survey used interviews with Irish locals to develop a comprehensive account of 
the lands in most of the island, but it created no maps. This approach harkened 
back to medieval methods, failing to provide the English authorities with work­
able documents for the military control and redistribution of the land.17 
In December 1654, Dr. William Petty took charge of a renewed surveying 
effort that became known as the Down Survey. Dismissing prior surveys as 
expensive and poorly organized, he pointed out that surveyors who had actu­
ally measured land with care received less money than those who worked quickly 
and inaccurately. As a consequence, surveyors had relied too much on estima­
tion and local Irish accounts. Petty's more systematic Irish surveys became a 
catalyst for legitimizing land seizures and reallocations.18 
To remedy the failures of the initial surveys, he broke the process of survey­
ing into its constituent parts, farming out specialties to English soldiers in 
assembly-line fashion: fieldwork, protracting, calculating, converting measure­
ments, drawing maps, describing surveys in writing, and oversight. Working 
together, the soldiers calculated acreage from scale measurements made on paper. 
Petty standardized field books and issued a standard set of tools and instructions 
for conducting surveys. His men made qualitative judgments, defining profitable 
lands as "meadow, arable, [or] pasture" and dividing pasture lands into a variety 
of categories: "common pasture, healthy pasture, rocky pastures, mountaine pas­
ture, or boggy pasture." In all, he organized around a thousand soldiers to not 
only measure the land but also evaluate its quality and assign it a monetary value. 
These men endured imperfect working conditions, including unclear boundaries 
between lordships, tiny fields that necessitated careful individual surveys, inade­
quate descriptions of the lands to be surveyed, and fellow surveyors who pawned 
their instruments. Cutting across the boundaries of existing domains, the Down 
Survey created many new landholdings and erased old property rights in the pro­
cess. As a result, the outright hostility of the native Irish necessitated that a 
constant military guard accompanied the surveyors. Despite this, in County 
Wicklow, eight of Petty's surveyors died at the hands oflrish rebels. This violence 
foreshadowed the later struggles of North American surveyors who often found 
· 
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Because the crown intended to redistribute land for the benefit of the empire, 
the Down surveyors paid greater attention to some lands than others. The English 
did not reallocate lands controlled by Protestants, so those estates did not receive 
surveys. Similarly, surveyors lacked interest in surveying marginal lands; Petty
received £7.3.4 for every thousand acres of profitable land, and only £3.0.0 for 
every thousand acres of unprofitable or undistributable land. This discrepancy 
in pay led the disgruntled to charge that surveyors had corruptly claimed mar­
ginal lands as profitable, causing soldiers to receive land bounties of lesser value.20 
Although the Down Survey intended to demystify the question of landhold­
ing in Ireland, drawing precise boundaries often had the opposite effect. Squabbles 
over the survey occupied much of Petty's time, and the process of land settle­
ment dragged on slowly, despite the speed with which Petty executed the sur­
vey. Because surveying remapped economic value onto real estate, many 
owners felt that the surveying process had improperly evaluated their land. In 
addition to recipients of "profitable" lands maintaining that they had in fact 
received marginal lands, those who had financed their own military campaigns, 
the "adventurers," relied on earlier surveys that underestimated the size oflrish 
lands. They used these false estimates to claim that they should receive a pro­
portionally larger section of land, now that Ireland proved bigger than previ­
ously imagined. Ireland's surveyor general, Benjamin Worsley, accused Petty of 
using his influence to assist his friends. Although governmental commissions 
later exonerated Petty of wrongdoing, these legal entanglements prevented the 
swift and regular settlement that the English meant for surveying to effect. 
Whether in Ireland or later in North America, the process of land settlement 
became messy, especially when powerful interests contested the same plots of 
land. As legal documents, surveys became another tool that allowed contesting 
parties to prolong court cases about land disputes.21 
Between 1654 and 1659, the Down Survey had assessed and mapped virtually 
the whole oflreland-an unprecedented feat in European history. English elites 
acquired huge amounts oflrish land, both because the Down Survey turned up 
more profitable land than expected and because many adventurers and common 
soldiers sold their shares in Irish land cheaply to officers. Nonetheless, agents 
for the adventurers and officers demanded more land for payment than the gov­
ernment could supply, resulting in the displacement of many "innocent" Cath­
olic Irish lords (who had not resisted English invasion) farther and farther west. 
Most eventually settled in the counties of Connacht.22 
With the return of the English monarchy in 1660, shortly after the Down Sur­
vey concluded, thousands of adventurers and soldiers who had allied with the 
republican government found it difficult to apply to the crown to confirm their 
claims of Irish land. Nevertheless, the survey resulted in the transfer of most of 
the lands in Ireland into Protestant hands. Protestants held less than one-fifth 
of Irish land in 1600, but more than half of that land in 1641, and more than 
85 percent in 1700. As these numbers indicate, the English never confiscated the 
entirety of Ireland. Instead, they intended for soldiers to take up land in con­
tiguous townships and dominate neighboring Catholics. Ultimately, this plan 
did not come to fruition, as some Catholic lords returned to their home prov­
inces after years of western exile. Regardless of who ruled the great estates, Cath­
olic tenants remained the backbone of the economy and a heavy majority of the 
population.23 
Despite English misgivings about Irish barbarity, the island's people had long 
engaged in market agriculture. In the centuries leading up to the Cromwellian 
conquest, Gaelic elites operated market towns, and the Old English oversaw the 
regular trade of raw materials from Irish farms to other western European coun­
tries. However, the transfer of Catholic land to the English accelerated the rise 
of export-based agriculture in Ireland. English lords desired pasturelands that 
would turn the island into a center for the production of leather goods. To cre­
ate these pastures, and also to ensure lines of sight for defense, the English cleared 
the island of trees, financing a lumber industry that deforested much of Ireland 
in the forty years from 1590 to 1630. From 1530 to 1730, the acreage used for agri­
culture increased by almost 20 percent. The "Big House," the landlord's home, 
walled and hedged off from his tenants, became the central building from which 
planters and overseers directed their Irish tenants' farming activity. In addition, 
the English promoted the use of planned, rectilinear market towns not just as 
hubs for plantation agriculture but also as centers of military and judicial activ­
ity. The turn toward market agriculture accelerated throughout Ireland after the 
Cromwellian settlement during the 1650s, even affecting the western province 
of Connacht, where the English had the least penetration. 24 
William Penn's family benefited directly from the Cromwellian settlement 
of Ireland. In 1654 his father, Admiral William Penn, received estates worth 
£300 in rent per year "in consideration of the great losses sustained by General 
Pen and his wife by the rebellion in Ireland." The family took up land in Macroom 
in County Cork and bought nearby lands in Kilcrea. In 1655, Admiral Penn com­
manded the naval invasion of the Spanish West Indies. The expedition failed, 
resulting in Cromwell imprisoning the admiral in the Tower of London. After his 
release later that year, he moved his family to Macroom. It was there that a young 
William Penn first encountered Quakers.25 
Following the Restoration and Charles !l's ascent to the throne, Ireland's titles 
fell into disorder as the king sought to restore land to royalist favorites. These 
realignments affected the Penn family, despite the admiral's support for the roy­
alists. His lands in Macroom and Kilcrea had originally belonged to the aristo­
cratic MacCarthy dynasty of Muskerry. In 1658, Charles II had already granted 
the lord of Muskerry the title of the earl of Clancarty. After regaining the throne, 
he took the Penn family's lands to restore them to their original Irish owners. 
Between 1665 and 1667, the admiral sent his son William, then in his early twen­
ties, to advocate on the family's behalf for compensation. As a result, the crown's 
Court of Claims awarded the Penns a series of estates near County Cork's 
coastline. By 1670, Admiral Penn held sixty-eight separate holdings in three 
baronies, approximately 12,000 acres in all.26 
During the trip to Ireland in the mid-166os, William Penn became commit­
ted to Quakerism, which resulted in his own imprisonment in the Tower of Lon­
don. Upon his release in 1669, his father dispatched him to Ireland again, to 
manage the family estates there until the admiral's health began to fail in 1670. 
While Penn spent most of his time in Ireland visiting with the members of high 
society and his fellow Quakers, his principal business on the island was to put 
his family's finances on a firm footing. This meant bargaining with the locals 
who would rent out the family estates and overseeing disputes about the par­
ticulars of the tracts of land. Penn recorded making six separate new surveys, 
and he checked his findings against the Civil Survey records and official maps. To 
aid his understanding, Penn commissioned maps for his estates. This process 
became complicated by the patchwork nature of official surveys: at Geiragh and 
Knocknacaple, he held lands for which no surveys had been made, because 
Protestants had previously held them. His mapmaker assumed the official out­
line and acreage of those holdings by comparing them to records he had already 
made of neighboring lands. As a whole, the Penn family estate brought in approx­
imately £1,100 in yearly revenue at this time, about one-tenth of which went to 
the crown as quitrents.27 
Penn's attitude toward his family's lands and their inhabitants was typically 
English. When visiting Captain Boles, one of his father's tenants in Shanagarry, 
Penn commented only that the land was "well Improv'd." On the way, he trav­
eled by "a road well Im prov' d & much English." When assessing the rent for other 
sets of lands, he debated the worth of a windmill or included the "Considerable 
Improvements" on the land in the price. However, Penn "showed very little inter­
est in the oppressed native population" of Ireland during his visits, as the edi-
tors of'Jhe Papers of William Penn point out. As noted by Hiram Morgan, Penn's
mentions of Irish locals were perfunctory and unkind: "They are rarely sur­
named, Jet alone first-named and they are the subject of passing derogatory
remarks about their barbarous, superstitious customs." For example, Penn dis­
missed a local burial as "Barberous like the heathen."
28 
While in Ireland, Penn became friends with William Petty. Penn was a guest 
in Petty's home in 1667 and visited with him more than once during his later 
trip to Ireland. It is reasonable to assume that Penn examined Down Survey 
maps, and possibly other records related to his estates, while at Petty's home. In 
1675, Petty appealed to Penn to ask for a reduction in the quitrents that he needed 
to pay for his extensive Irish lands. Pressed with his own difficulties in paying 
quitrents, Penn lobbied successfully on Petty's behalf. Penn felt warmth toward 
Petty: in his letter describing these lobbying activities, he wrote, "I will run, goe, 
or doe ten times more for thee at any time."29 
Penn's experience in Ireland helped cement his conception of how a state 
could properly direct landownership for the benefit of the landholding class. Sur­
veys in Ireland had made land fungible: lands need not hold their traditional 
values and confusing medieval land tenures if they could instead be measured 
for acreage and evaluated for quality. New lords like the Penns could substitute 
holdings in Macroom with holdings elsewhere in Cork, without much material 
loss. In addition, surveys effectively eliminated the rights of traditional occu­
pants while bolstering the rights of titleholders. All the while, surveys and maps 
made bewildering tangles of landholdings comprehensible and tangible for non­
resident landowners and potential purchasers. If anything, Ireland's surveys 
were not comprehensive enough: Penn found it inconvenient that the hodge­
podge of Irish surveys had failed to measure and map Protestant lands, which 
made it necessary for him to conduct resurveys.30 
Over time, in the reign of Charles II, and especially in the reign of James II 
(from 1685 to 1688), Protestant landholders in Ireland felt less secure. Charles II 
had many supporters among Catholics, and James II openly supported Catho­
lics. The government's support for old Irish titleholders soon became apparent, 
causing Protestants' land values to drop. As early as 1671, Petty began to write 
about the possibility of transplanting Irish Catholics into England and more 
Protestants into Ireland. His argument was social and economic: socially, Cath­
olics would be less of a threat as minorities in England (or would strengthen 
Catholic interests there, a spin he put on his position once James II took power). 
Economically, with the Irish mostly gone, Ireland's countryside could be put to 
the best possible use. In Petty's view, the island could be turned into a cattle 
ranch.31 
As Ireland became increasingly problematic, America began to hold increas­
ing aJlure as a region where scientific management could yield profits for English 
landholders and the empire as a whole. By 1680, William Penn already had 
experience with Quaker settlements in West Jersey. He petitioned Charles II for a 
province, hoping that he could both create a zone of religious freedom and per­
manently improve his financial situation: over the course of the 1670s, he had 
already amassed approximately £10,000 of debt from lavish spending. Because of 
Penn's personal relations with members of the court, the crown likely granted the 
province as a personal favor and also as a cheap way to repay a debt to his father, 
Admiral Penn, who had spent £11,000 supplying the government with provisions 
in Ireland. By 1680, the interest on this debt amounted to £16,000.32 
Pennsylvania provided an opportunity for surveying to place new values on 
previously untapped lands on a grand scale, and both Penn and Petty found the 
prospect exciting. The two friends corresponded regularly, and Petty acquired 
one of the first maps of Pennsylvania made after Penn acquired his proprietor­
ship of the colony. Petty was one of the first investors to buy a five-thousand­
acre plot, but did not settle his land before his death in 1687. Penn also arranged 
for Petty's wife Elizabeth to receive twenty thousand acres in combination with 
one of her relatives, but they eventually backed out of the deal and Penn found 
other purchasers.33 
Although Petty never settled his land, he ruminated on various schemes for 
how a large landholder could make money in Pennsylvania. He speculated that 
five thousand acres of land would need two hundred families (one thousand 
people) to make it productive. If they cleared all of the land quickly over the win­
ter, one thousand acres could be left for planting, and four thousand acres for 
cattle. Paying for the passage of the people, cattle, food, and materials needed wou Id 
amount to a cost of £30,100. Petty estimated that the returns on the rent 
would amount to £5,300 per year, so that a developer could expect to break even 
after seven years. Later, in 1686, Petty wrote up a proposal for Penn to grant him 
a region of bottomland laying along 12 miles of riverfront, and stretching back 
into the countryside for 6.5 miles. In return for this tract of fifty thousand acres, 
Petty would pay a yearly rent of one one-hundredth of all of the crops and ani­
mals produced on the land. Nothing ever came of this proposal.34 
Petty also wrote up a series of questions about Pennsylvania's native inhabit­
ants, trying to imagine how they might be put to profitable use in the English 
empire. He wanted to learn demographic information, including age distribu­
tions, rates of stillbirth, and the length of time it took mothers to wean. He also 
inquired about the Indians' physiques, facial features, language, religion, laws, 
economy, and capacity to wage war, among other subjects. His final sentences 
addressed questions truly critical to Penn's colony: "What is their manner and 
rate of selling Lands to the English?" and "Is there much Lying and Fraude 
amongst them?"35 
In addition to the questions about Native Americans, Petty wrote a document 
entitled "General Cautions Concerning Pennsylvania," which he likely intended 
for Penn's benefit. Some of Petty's advice was not particularly practical; for exam-
pie, he suggested that the general population should pay to raise all the children 
collectively, that a single sermon should be preached in all congregations, and 
that "matters of fact which cannot bee decided, bee left to Lott." On the other 
hand, Petty also wanted registries set up for all contracts, and exact accounts 
made of arrivals, births, and deaths. Men should not study the classics, but 
"arithmetic & measuring & drawing." Unemployment should be avoided in a 
colony with such a low population density, so criminals should be punished with 
whippings, not imprisonment. Similarly, debtors should forfeit their land and 
improvements, without facing prison time. He also believed that Pennsylvania 
should "admit the Native Women into freedome," presumably to add to the 
colony's population. Petty generously estimated the colony to contain nearly 
fifty million acres-by charging rent of one half-penny per year, Penn could 
eventually make the princely sum of £100,000 annually.36 
Perhaps most importantly, Petty cautioned his friend to "Avoyd Stragling 
plantations." In America's southern colonies, no townships were surveyed prior 
to settlement, so the first colonists in a region chose where to purchase their own 
lands. This practice, known as indiscriminate location, often resulted in irregu­
larly shaped tracts of land, where individual farms might monopolize desirable 
bottom lands while leaving less desirable uplands unpurchased. If Penn followed 
the southern model and allowed his purchasers to have plantations that strag­
gled into the backcountry, his revenue would suffer in the unwanted gaps between 
settlements. Following a clear township system would also allow him to plan for 
urban centers, which could increase the desirability of his lands and lead to more 
income. Because English theorists typically justified their presence as coloniz­
ers by their proper use and improvement of the natural landscape, Petty's opin­
ions in this regard were both practical and ideological.37 
While Penn did not embrace all of the particulars of Petty's plans, he did see 
the obvious benefits of maintaining control over land distribution in his colony. 
From its founding, Pennsylvania continuously maintained the office of surveyor 
general, whose responsibilities included managing deputy surveyors and review­
ing the legality of their returns of survey for the Land Office. This highly cen­
tralized surveying structure contrasted with the decentralized surveying regime 
in other American colonies founded before the Down Survey, such as Virginia. 
Surveys would help Penn market his territory to potential buyers, keep track of 
purchases, and later guarantee future income in the form of quitrents. Main­
taining a centralized depository for surveys connected to land sales would obvi­
ate the problems that Penn encountered trying to piece together a picture of his 
landholdings in Ireland.38 
In a variety of ways, Penn based his initial vision for Pennsylvania on Irish 
precedents. In April 1681, he published Some Account of the Province of Pennsyl­
vania, in which he described his plan to people his colony with buyers, renters, 
and servants. He intended to sell lands in five-thousand-acre blocks for £100, 
with a permanent quitrent of 5 shillings per year (renters and servants would 
receive higher yearly burdens). One-tenth of the land would be reserved perma­
nently for his family's use. To encourage settlement, he would allow occupants 
the rights to the underground mineral wealth. Penn imagined that adventurers 
would form companies in his new endeavor, and that they could divvy up lands 
among themselves. He wrote, "if the persons concerned please, a tract of land 
shall be surveyed, say fifty thousand acres to a hundred adventurers, in which 
some of the best shall be set out for towns or cities ... the remainder of the fifty 
thousand acres shall be shared among the said adventurers . .. The manner of 
the dividend I shall not be strict in." This vision harkened back to the conquest 
of Ireland, where "adventurers " risked their money and sought their repayment 
in widely separated plots of land.39 
Even in his early descriptions of Philadelphia, Penn painted a vision of a town 
that resembled the rural countryside of Ireland more than an early modern city. 
Penn wanted a city of ten thousand acres, with hundred-acre lots for each five­
thousand-acre share in his colony. Each lot would front the river for a distance of 
825 feet. Penn wanted houses "in the middle of its plot as to the breadth of the 
way of it, that so there may be ground on each side for gardens or orchards or 
fields, that it may be a green country town, which will never be burnt and always 
be wholesome." 'The result of such a distribution would have dotted a sprawling, 
fifteen-square-mile tract with one hundred big houses on huge farm plots, creat­
ing a miniature version of Ireland's estates. Such a city truly could never catch 
on fire.40 
Penn soon had to adapt his early plans to realities on the ground and the 
whims of his customers: in July 1681 he noted, "I cannot make money without 
special concessions." Unable to find enough purchasers of 5,000-acre tracts, Penn 
reduced the preferred size of his plots to 500 acres and began selling tracts as 
small as 125 acres. For a purchaser of large amounts of acreage, like the merchant 
Ralph Fretwell who bought 40,000 acres, Penn could discount his prices. Early 
purchasers would receive bonus lots in Philadelphia, which took on a new, less 
ambitious character. Since the site for his new colony rested on top of the earlier 
colony of New Sweden, whose inhabitants still farmed there, the original plan 
for a green country town could not be sustained. By the spring of 1682, Penn's 
agents could only acquire 300 acres of riverfront land for Philadelphia, and the 
scale of the city needed to be massively reduced.41 
Because Pennsylvania was not empty, Penn had to negotiate with both Native 
American and European inhabitants in order to sell and settle his lands. His 
interest in and attitude toward Pennsylvania's native inhabitants bore little 
resemblance to his earlier lack of concern about the Irish. By August 1683, Penn 
had spent enough time with local Lenapes to answer many of Petty's questions 
about Native Americans in detail. He punctuated a discussion of their language, 
attitudes, religion, and customs with personal anecdotes-albeit without the sta-
tistical precision that Petty may have preferred. Although we have no direct 
evidence, it is possible that Petty's interest in Indian culture may have helped 
spark Penn's fascination. It is also possible that once Penn decided that it would 
be moral and expedient to purchase land from the Indians, he realized that he 
would need to understand them better. No such need arose in Ireland. With 
regard to land sales, Penn endeavored to treat the local Indians honestly, but he 
also warned his agents in 1681 that they must be vigilant when making purchases, 
because the Indians would "sell one another's [land] if you be not careful."42 
From 1682 to 1684, Penn conferred regularly with the local Lenapes, paying 
£1,200 in goods for the lands surrounding the site of Philadelphia. The Lenapes 
balked at Penn's terms as they began to understand the massive scale of Penn's 
undertaking and the population density that would come with his new colony, 
but both sides avoided bloodshed. In 1686 in central Bucks County, the Lenapes 
threatened to kill surveyors making further measurements without payment in 
full from Penn. To defuse the situation, Pennsylvania officials wrote up a deed 
(but never paid for the land), leaving an opening for his descendants to conduct 
the infamous, fraudulent Walking Purchase of 1737. With regard to the European 
settlers, Penn's government initially incorporated the former Swedish settlers 
into the court system, but his agents also systematically pressured them to sell 
their lands. As time passed, their numbers paled in comparison to incoming 
settlers, and they lost what little political clout they had. By 1700, almost half had 
left the colony to settle in West Jersey. This exodus mirrored a similar develop­
ment in the Indian community, where disease and outmigration left the popula­
tion about a quarter of the size it had been when Penn began his negotiations.43 
Another complication precluded the easy settlement of Pennsylvania. Penn 
wanted access to the whole of the Delaware River in order to control Philadel­
phia's route to the ocean. The title to this territory was disputed: Maryland had 
claimed and already settled some of the lower Delaware. The king's brother 
James, Duke of York, who had control over the land east of the Delaware, granted 
Penn what is now the state of Delaware, but his authority to do so was dubious. 
Furthermore, Penn believed that his charter for Pennsylvania took precedent 
over Maryland's northern border, which had been fixed at 40 degrees north lati­
tude. Officials from the two colonies could not agree on a survey line, and when 
James became king in 1685, he ruled in Penn's favor. Much as had been the case 
with the allegations of corruption against Petty in Ireland, surveys alone could 
not solve political problems without consensus.44 
The job of regulating and mapping Pensylvania's early settlements fell primar­
ily to the surveyor general. Penn initially appointed his cousin, William Crispin, 
to fill this role. When Crispin died en route to Pennsylvania, Penn turned to the 
fifty-eight-year-old Thomas Holme as his first acting surveyor general. Like Penn, 
Holme was an English Quaker with deep ties to Ireland. As a young man, Holme 
had served as a captain in Cromwell's army, then transitioned to serving as a 
surveyor for the Civil and Down Surveys. Through payments for his national 
service and by speculating on the lands of other soldiers, he amassed an estate 
of more than four thousand acres in Wexford, Ireland. In the aftermath of 
Cromwell's military campaign, Holme joined the Society of Friends and soon 
became one of the most prominent organizers and writers on their behalf. His 
religious activities and proselytization caused him to be arrested numerous times 
and would have made him well known to Penn. They certainly would have met 
during the course of Penn's time in Ireland in 1669, when Thomas Loe converted 
Penn (and Penn spent extended time with William Petty). It is possible that they 
may have met as early as Penn's initial introduction to the Quaker religion dur­
ing the mid-165os, when Admiral Penn invited Loe along with other Quaker 
speakers to give a discourse on their religion in the Penns' home in Macroom. 
By 1677, Holme had moved to live in William Crispin's house in Waterford, Ire­
land, where he was operating as a merchant, shipping goods to America. Given 
his background, Holme became an obvious choice to replace Crispin. As a mark 
of Penn's faith in Holme's ability, he also made him an assistant to the deputy 
governor William Markham, another of Penn's cousins.45 
Upon arrival, Holme had to evaluate the countryside and navigate the prob­
lem of land warrants being issued to different purchasers on a single plot of land. 
Because of the small size of Philadelphia, purchasers would only receive less than 
an acre each inside the rectilinear city, with the remainder being given to them 
in the "liberty lands" outside Philadelphia. In time, Holme had established a 
series of townships that stretched into the countryside around the city. In Penn's 
view, townships should "lie square," with at least ten families living in five­
thousand-acre blocks, keeping their homes in the middle of the township. While 
Penn was still in the colony, in August 1684, he counted at least fifty settled 
townships. Holme's 1687 map shows a series of more or less gridlike purchases 
that wend their way around the tributaries of the Delaware and the Schuylkill. 
The grid stopped abruptly in Bucks County, where the surveyors faced Indian 
opposition. As time went on, this scheme for orderly development slowly eroded. 
Pressure to expand into the backcountry caused this neat township system to 
languish, and Pennsylvania's interior increasingly resembled the "Stragling plan­
tations" that Petty had warned against.46 
Unlike many of his predecessors in English colonization, Penn harbored no 
illusions that his new colony would provide vast wealth from untapped mineral 
reserves or exotic farm products. instead, Pennsylvania would be a site where 
Quakers and other Protestants could practice their religions in peace, while Penn 
profited from the land: a better version oflreland. He summed up this sentiment 
neatly in July 1681: "Though I desire to extend religious freedom, yet I want some 
recompense for my trouble." Unfortunately, the colony never proved to be the 
financial boon that he imagined, and his finances remained precarious through-
out his life, despite his collecting more than £9,000 from over 700,000 acres of 
land sales by 1685.47 
Although his reach exceeded his grasp, Ireland's land distribution practices 
served as a model for William Penn. Given his life story, this should not be par­
ticularly surprising: Irish experiences were foundational to his identity. His path 
to religious conversion took place in Ireland, and Ireland was also where he began 
to make serious decisions about managing large estates. Penn adopted typically 
English attitudes about land use in his time as a lord, along with typically English 
attitudes about the Irish. Over time, his attitudes about people evolved, but 
his attitudes about land changed very little. 
In 1662, when writing his treatise on taxes, William Petty had waxed rhap­
sodic about the prospects of the English taking control over Ireland when the 
country was "as a white paper." After conquering the island, surveying it, map­
ping it, and redistributing its lands, Ireland could reasonably appear like a white 
paper on which the English could write the future. One can imagine how Petty's 
vision could captivate an idealistic and ambitious William Penn. We cannot 
know for sure if Penn first glimpsed maps of the Down Survey in Petty's Irish 
home, but we can see the Down Survey's influence on the orderly grids stretch­
ing away from the Delaware Valley that Thomas Holme depicted on his 1687 map 
of Pennsylvania. Much as the Down Survey had helped turn Ireland into a "white 
paper," centrally organized geometric surveys allowed Penn to erase the traces 
of his province's previous inhabitants and make "wilderness" lands legible to 
educated nonlocals. Armed with maps and round numbers of acres, he could 
market his lands to prospective buyers in Europe and maintain control over how 
the colony would spread into the interior.48 
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